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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT – DISCIPLINE – DECEPTION OF COURT
OR OBSTRUCTION OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota
v. Cynthia M. Feland
In re Disciplinary Action Against Feland2 involved an objection by
both Cynthia Feland and Disciplinary Counsel to the report of an attorney
disciplinary hearing panel finding Feland had violated North Dakota Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.8(d).3 The recommended sanction by the panel
was a sixty day suspension, and for Feland to pay the costs of the
proceeding totaling $11,272.21.4 The North Dakota Supreme Court
adopted the panel’s finding on the violation, but imposed more lenient
sanctions for the violation.5
Feland at the time in issue was an Assistant State’s Attorney in
Burleigh County.6 The allegation of professional misconduct arose out of
Feland’s prosecution of Charles Blunt.7 Feland prosecuted Blunt for
misapplication of entrusted property.8 Blunt was the executive director of
Workforce Safety and Insurance, and one of the issues in his criminal
prosecution was whether he failed to pursue the repayment of some
employee expenses WSI had paid to one of its hires.9 A WSI employee was
hired, and had his relocation expenses paid by WSI, contingent on
repayment of half the expenses if the employee left WSI within two years.10
The employee left within two years, but Blunt did not attempt to recoup
those expenses.11 An audit of the WSI finances turned up the unrecouped
expenses.12 Blunt told the auditors the employee had actually been forced
to resign, and that is why he did not pursue recovering the expenses.13
Based on that, the auditors did not further push the expense recoupment. 14
Feland, during the criminal investigation of Blunt, asked one of the auditors
to draft a memorandum about the relocation expense issue, which the
2. 2012 ND 174, 820 N.W.2d 672.
3. Feland, ¶ 1, 820 N.W.2d at 675.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 2.
7. Id.
8. Id. This prosecution was before the North Dakota Supreme Court three separate times.
State v. Blunt, 2011 ND 127, 799 N.W.2d 363; State v. Blunt, 2010 ND 144, 785 N.W.2d 909;
State v. Blunt, 2008 ND 135, 751 N.W.2d 692.
9. Feland, ¶ 2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 3.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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auditor drafted.15 At Blunt’s criminal trial, the auditor testified about
Blunt’s failure to recoup the expenses.16 Following his conviction, Blunt
brought a motion to vacate his conviction arguing the State had violated
North Dakota Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 for failing to turn over the
auditor’s memo in pretrial discovery.17
At the disciplinary evidentiary hearing, the panel was presented
conflicting accounts of whether Feland had turned over the auditor’s memo
to Blunt.18 Feland testified she had given the memo to her legal assistant,
and the legal assistant testified she thought the memo was provided, but was
not sure.19 The memo was not noted on the State’s Attorney’s discovery
checklist in the Blunt file.20 Blunt’s attorney testified the document was not
provided to him in pretrial discovery.21 The hearing panel held failure to
disclose the memo was a violation of North Dakota Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.8(d).22 The panel recommended that Feland’s license to practice
law be suspended for sixty days and she be required to pay the full costs of
the disciplinary proceeding.23
Feland made several arguments on appeal, the first being, that the
findings on Blunt’s post-conviction motion appeal that Blunt had not been
prejudiced simply foreclosed a finding of professional misconduct.24 The
North Dakota Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting the Rules of
Professional Conduct are concerned with the ethical conduct of attorneys
whereas the Rules of Criminal Procedure are not.25 The court held the
strength of the prosecutor’s case or prejudice to the criminal defendant does
not change where the ethical duty to disclose was violated.26 Accordingly,
the court held the failure to establish a violation of North Dakota Rule of
15. Id. ¶ 4, 820 N.W.2d at 675-76.
16. Id. ¶ 5, 820 N.W.2d at 676.
17. Id. ¶ 6. The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Blunt’s post-conviction
motion because he was not prejudiced by the failure to disclose. Id.
18. Id. ¶ 7.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. ¶ 8. That provision states
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) disclose to the defense at the earliest practical time all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal
all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the
prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
N.D. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.8(d).
23. Feland, ¶ 8, 820 N.W.2d at 676-77.
24. Id. ¶¶ 11-12, 820 N.W.2d at 677-78.
25. Id. ¶ 13, 820 N.W.2d at 678.
26. Id.
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Criminal Procedure 16 by the defendant in a criminal case is not a defense
to the prosecutor in a professional misconduct proceeding.27
Feland next argued a violation of Rule 3.8(d) should only be found
where there is clear and convincing evidence of intentionally withholding
exculpatory evidence.28 Disciplinary Counsel argued even knowing or
negligent failure to disclose violates Rule 3.8(d).29 After reviewing
different jurisdictions’ and commentators approaches to Rule 3.8(d), the
North Dakota Supreme Court held any failure to disclose is a violation.30
The plain language of the Rule has no mens rea requirement, and as such,
the court would not graft a mens rea requirement onto the Rule.31 The court
also noted that adopting an intentional failure to disclose standard could
lead to abusive practice in prosecutor’s discovery practices, such as having
no tracking of evidence disclosure.32 The standard is not one of strict
liability, however, and any of the three levels of culpable conduct under the
North Dakota Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions – 3.0, intentional,
knowingly, and negligently, are required.33 Thus, even the negligent failure
to disclose is now a violation of Rule 3.8(d), with the level of intent
primarily affecting the appropriate level of sanction to impose.34

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 15, 820 N.W.2d at 678-79.
Id.
Id. ¶ 22, 820 N.W.2d at 680.
Id. ¶¶ 19, 22.
Id. ¶ 23, 820 N.W.2d at 680-81.
Id. ¶ 24, 820 N.W.2d at 681.
See id. ¶¶ 40-42, 820 N.W.2d at 684-85.
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BURGLARY – INSTRUCTIONS – AS TO INTENT
State of North Dakota v. Trevor Lance Mertz
In State v. Mertz,35 Trevor Mertz appealed his conviction for burglary,
arguing the jury instructions given at trial were erroneous.36 Mertz argued
the judge should have answered a question posed to the court by the jury,
instead of instructing the jury they had already been given the law in the
jury instructions.37 The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the
conviction, concluding the district court had properly instructed the jury.38
Mertz was charged for burglary for taking a television after entering his
former girlfriend’s home.39 Mertz testified he loaned the television to his
former girlfriend, but two of the State’s witnesses testified the television
belonged to the former girlfriend.40 Following the presentations of both
sides’ cases the district judge gave the closing jury instructions on
burglary.41 The judge instructed the jury on the statutory definition of
burglary then gave the jury the essential elements that the state had to prove
in this case.42 Nowhere in the definition or in the elements did the judge
instruct the jury that it needed to find Mertz had intent to commit a specific
crime after having broken into his ex-girlfriend’s home.43 The jury was not
given any instruction on theft or any other offense.44 At no time before the
jury retired for deliberations did Mertz object to the jury instructions
given.45
While retired, the jury posed the following question to the court: “Can
someone be convicted of Burglary if they break into someone else’s home
for the sole purpose of retrieving their own personal property? Yes or
No?”46 After hearing argument from counsel, the judge responded that the
jury instruction given would stand, and did not answer the question yes or
no.47 The jury found Mertz guilty of burglary.48
35. 2012 ND 145, 818 N.W.2d 782.
36. Mertz, ¶ 1, 818 N.W.2d at 783.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. ¶ 2.
40. Id. at 783-84.
41. Id. ¶ 3, 818 N.W.2d at 784.
42. Id. The judge followed the North Dakota State Bar Association’s recommended
instruction verbatim. See STATE BAR ASS’N OF N.D & N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION
COMM’N, N.D. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL § K-9.10 (2011).
43. Mertz, ¶ 3, 818 N.W.2d at 784.
44. Id.
45. Id. ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d at 785.
46. Id. ¶ 4, 818 N.W.2d at 784.
47. Id.
48. Id. ¶ 6.
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Mertz argued on appeal the proper response to the jury’s question was
“no” but also attacked the legal sufficiency of the jury instructions.49 He
argued the jury instructions needed to include a provision requiring the jury
find he had intent to commit a specific crime, in this case theft, following
his break in.50 Because Mertz failed to object to the jury instructions when
given, review of this issue was for plain error.51
The statute Mertz was charged under states
A person is guilty of burglary if he willfully enters or
surreptitiously remains in a building or occupied structure, or a
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, when at the time
the premises are not open to the public and the actor is not
licensed, invited, or otherwise privileged to enter or remain as the
case may be, with intent to commit a crime therein.52
Mertz argued the language “with the intent to commit a crime therein”
required the State to prove intent to commit some specific crime.53 He
argued the State did not show he had the intent to commit the specific crime
of theft because theft involves the unauthorized possession of another
person’s property,54 while Mertz maintained the television was owned by
him.55
In this appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court was forced to interpret
the meaning of the “intent to commit a crime therein” provision in the
burglary statute.56 A majority of the court held the statute was not clear on
its face whether the State needed to prove intent to commit some specific
crime in a burglary prosecution.57 Since the statute was ambiguous, looking
at the legislative history was appropriate to determine the legislature’s
goal.58
North Dakota Century Code title 12.1 is based on the proposed Federal
Criminal Code.59 Accordingly, the comments to the proposed Federal
Criminal Code are helpful in interpreting the North Dakota Criminal
Code.60 Examining the comments to the section on burglary, the North
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. ¶ 9, 818 N.W.2d at 785.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 10 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-22-02(1) (2012)).
Id.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-02(1) (2012).
Mertz, ¶ 10, 818 N.W.2d at 785.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶ 12.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 785-86.
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Dakota Supreme Court noted the precise crime intended to be committed
was not specified in the code so that a prosecutor would not need to prove
that precise crime.61 Because the precise crime intended to be committed is
not an element of burglary, the North Dakota Supreme Court held the
district court’s jury instruction was correct.62
Justice Sandstrom concurred in the judgment of the court, but did not
find the statute to be ambiguous.63 He found the plain words of the statute
do not require the State to prove intent to commit a specific crime, and so
he agreed with the majority’s interpretation of the statute.64 Justice
Sandstrom, therefore, found it inappropriate to consult the official
comments to the proposed Federal Criminal Code.65

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. ¶ 13, 818 N.W.2d at 786.
Id. ¶ 14.
Id. ¶ 20, 818 N.W.2d at 787 (Sandstrom, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
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CHILD SUPPORT – APPEAL AND ERROR
Michiel James Nuveen v. Elizabeth Ann Nuveen
In Nuveen v. Nuveen,66 Michiel Nuveen appealed from a district court
judgment that deviated upward from the Child Support Guidelines, ordering
him to pay $3,620.00 per month in child support.67 Michiel and Elizabeth
Nuveen were married in 1991.68 During their marriage, they had three
children together.69 Under a Partial Divorce Judgment entered on October
16, 2007, Elizabeth was awarded primary custody of all three children.70
Also pursuant to this judgment, Michiel’s child support was set at $4,250
per month, the highest guidelines monthly support amount.71
Subsequent to this Divorce Judgment, one of the Nuveen children
began residing with Michiel.72 Michiel moved the district court to modify
the monthly support amount given the new arrangement.73 Based on
Michiel’s monthly income of more than $42,000 and Elizabeth’s monthly
income of $6191, the district court subtracted Elizabeth’s presumptive
support from Michiel’s presumptive support as required by statute.74
Because under the new arrangement Michiel’s presumptive monthly
support would be $3543, and Elizabeth’s monthly support would be $1087,
the district court determined Michiel’s new monthly support obligation was
$2456.75
Nevertheless, upon a finding that the children’s needs were more
expansive than children accustomed to a lower standard of living, and that
Michiel had an increased ability to pay, the district court found an upward
deviation Michiel’s child support would be in the best interests of the
children, and ordered Michiel to pay $3750 per month to Elizabeth.76
Michiel Nuveen filed a Rule 59 Motion for a New Trial on Child
Support Motion or in the Alternative for Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order.77 In the motion, Michiel asked the court to
reconsider the deviation and to correct a mathematical error in calculating

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

2012 ND 260, No. 20120246, 2012 WL 6582491 (N.D. Dec. 18, 2012).
Nuveen, at *1.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5, 2012 WL 6582491, at *2.
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Elizabeth’s income.78 The court granted the motion in correcting the
mathematical error, but refused to reconsider the upward deviation.79
Michiel then appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, claiming the
district court erred in granting the deviation.80
In the North Dakota Supreme Court’s analysis, the court found that the
presumptive support obligation in the guidelines may be rebutted if, among
other things, the obligor has an increased ability to pay, and the adjustment
is in the best interests of the children.81 In this instance, because Michiel’s
income far exceeds the amount of $12,500 per month, and because his
monthly entertainment budget is much greater than Elizabeth’s, the facts are
sufficient to justify the district court’s upward deviation from the
guidelines.82
In response to Michiel’s argument that Hegen v. Hegen83 should be
followed, the court found that the clearly erroneous standard of review
guided that decision, and such standard must be followed in this case. 84
Because there was sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the district
court judgment, the court refused to reverse the decision.85 The court
likewise found that the upward deviation did not require a showing of the
appropriate needs in specific amounts, in a line-by-line accounting
fashion.86 The “appropriate needs” analysis allows the court to look to the
lifestyle a child may expect when the parent’s have substantial income,
without requiring specific findings of these expanded needs.87
Lastly, the court refused to find any error as a matter of law in the
district court’s findings.88 The district court had not misapplied the
guidelines by determining the deviation after offsetting the parties’
presumptive child support amounts.89 The lower court had found that
Michiel could afford to pay more, not that Elizabeth should pay less.90

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 6.
82. Id. ¶ 8, 2012 WL 6582491, at *3.
83. In Hegen v. Hegen, the Supreme Court upheld a district court ruling, despite argument
that the non-custodial parent could afford to pay an additional amount. 452 N.W.2d 96, 102 (N.D.
1990).
84. Id. ¶¶ 9-10 (citing Hegen v. Hegen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 102 (N.D. 1990)).
85. Id. ¶ 11.
86. Id. ¶ 12, 2012 WL 6582491, at *4 (citing Martire v. Martire, 2012 ND 197, ¶ 24, 822
N.W.2d 450, 462).
87. Id. ¶ 13 (citing Hegen v. Hegen, 452 N.W.2d 96, 102 (1990)).
88. Id. ¶ 15.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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Therefore, the district court’s judgment deviating upward from the Child
Support Guidelines and ordering Michiel Nuveen to pay $3650 per month
in child support was affirmed.91

91. Id. ¶ 16, 2012 WL 6582491, at *5.
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COMPARATIVE FAULT – DERIVATIVE ACTION OF A PARENT – A
PARENT’S RIGHT TO RECOVER MEDICAL EXPENSES PAID
ON BEHALF OF A CHILD
M.M. and Thomas Moore v. Fargo Public School District No. 1
In M.M. v. Fargo Public School District No. 1,92 Thomas Moore
appealed a judgment dismissing his claim for medical expenses incurred by
his son, M.M., in their personal injury action against Fargo Public School
District No. 1 and Eugenia Hart.93 The North Dakota Supreme Court
affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Moore’s claim for
medical damages was correctly denied because his past economic damages
were derived from M.M.’s injuries.94
In May 2004, M.M., a fifteen year old student at Discovery Middle
School in Fargo, was injured while practicing a bike stunt in the school
auditorium.95 The stunt was being practiced in preparation for 60s day,
which was part of the curriculum for Hart’s history class.96
Moore and M.M. brought a personal injury action against Hart and the
District.97 After the district court dismissed their action against the District
as a matter of law, the North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district
court, finding, among other things, it had erred in ruling that the
recreational immunity statute barred the action against the district, and
remanded for a new trial.98
On remand, Hart settled and the case was tried to a jury only against
the District.99 The jury awarded Moore $285,000 for past economic
damages based on M.M.’s medical expenses incurred while he was a
minor.100 The jury allocated thirty percent of the fault to Hart, and seventy
percent to M.M.101 Because the jury concluded that M.M.’s fault was
greater than the fault of the District, the court entered judgment dismissing
the action against the district and awarded costs in its favor.102 The district
court also denied Moore’s request to have judgment entered in his favor for
$85,500, which represents thirty percent of the $285,000 award for M.M.’s

92. 2012 ND 79, 815 N.W.2d 273.
93. M.M., ¶ 1, 815 N.W.2d at 274.
94. Id.
95. Id. ¶ 2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. ¶ 3.
100. Id. ¶ 3, 815 N.W.2d at 275.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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past medical expenses.103
The district court concluded “a child’s
negligence should be considered in determining the extent of a parent’s
recovery against a third party for medical expenses paid.”104
Moore argued on appeal that the district court erred in rejecting his
claim for $85,500 in past medical expenses for M.M. because North Dakota
law allows a parent without fault to recover medical expenses for a child’s
injury in proportion to the defendant’s fault.105
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its analysis by discussing the
comparative fault provisions of North Dakota Century Code section 3203.2-02.106 The court found that in enacting this section, the Legislature
“clearly intended to replace joint and several liability with several allocation
of damages among those who commit torts in proportion to the fault of
those who contributed to an injury.”107 Nevertheless, section 32-03.2-02
does not create an independent basis for tort liability, but deals only with
the allocation of damages where parties have already been found to be at
fault.108 With regard to the modified comparative fault statutes, nothing is
written concerning whether a parent without fault may recover medical
expenses for a child’s injuries in proportion to the defendant’s fault when
the child’s fault exceeds the defendant’s fault.109
Because nothing is found specifically in the statutes regarding this
particular matter, the court cited the general doctrine that a parent’s claims
“for medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured . . . child are derivative,
and the negligence of the injured family member is attributed to the person
with the derivative claim.”110 After demonstrating that the weight of
authority prevented Moore’s recovery in this case, the court looked to
additional arguments presented by Moore.111
The court went on to reject Moore’s argument that barring his recovery
because of M.M.’s negligence violates the plain language and purpose of
North Dakota Century Code section 14-09-21, finding that attributing
M.M.’s fault to Moore does not impose liability upon Moore for any torts
that may have been committed by M.M.112
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. ¶ 5.
106. Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 815 N.W.2d at 275-76.
107. Id. ¶ 7, 815 N.W.2d at 276 (quoting Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead YMCA, 2001 ND
139, ¶ 25, 632 N.W.2d 407, 417).
108. Id. ¶ 9.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶ 10 (citing 57B AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 1030, at 294 (2004)).
111. See id. ¶ 5-17, 815 N.W.2d at 276-80.
112. Id. ¶ 11, 815 N.W.2d at 277.
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The court likewise rejected Moore’s argument that his obligation to
support M.M. under section 14-09-08 somehow distinguished North Dakota
from those jurisdictions that have adopted the majority rule, and refused to
follow the Iowa Supreme Court in Handeland v. Brown, because the
decision is almost forty years old and has received little acceptance outside
the state of Iowa.113
Instead, citing Hockema v. J.S., the court discussed the persuasiveness
of this decision, agreeing with the Indiana court’s analysis of a parent’s
derivative rights with respect to his children.114 Because of the derivative
nature of a parent’s right to recover a child’s medical expenses, the parent
may likewise be barred by the child’s comparative negligence if it exceeds
that of the tortfeasor.115
After subsequently rejecting an attempt by Moore to distinguish
Hockema, as well as leaving the matter of unjust enrichment by the district
to North Dakota’s Legislature, the court concluded that a parent is not
entitled to recover medical expenses paid on behalf of an injured minor
child where the child’s comparative fault is greater than that of the
tortfeasor.116 Because Moore’s claim for past medical expenses derives
from M.M.’s injuries, and M.M. was denied recovery under comparative
fault statutes, the court held that the district court correctly dismissed
Moore’s claim for M.M.’s medical expenses, and affirmed the district
court’s judgment.117

113.
114.
2005)).
115.
116.
117.

Id. ¶¶ 13, 14, 815 N.W.2d at 277-78.
Id. ¶ 15, 815 N.W.2d at 279 (citing Hockema v. J.S., 832 N.E.2d 537 (Ind. Ct. App.
Id. (citing Hockema v. J.S., 832 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)).
Id. ¶ 9, 815 N.W.2d at 279-80.
Id. ¶ 17, 815 N.W.2d at 280.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – NORTH DAKOTA COURTS
North Dakota State Board of Higher Education v. Al Jaeger, Secretary
of State, in his official capacity, Fighting Sioux Ballot Measures aka
Committee For Understanding and Respect
In North Dakota State Board of Higher Education v. Jaeger,118 the
North Dakota Supreme Court majority sought to exercise the court’s
original jurisdiction and decide the constitutionality of the legislative
enactment requiring the University of North Dakota (UND) to use the
“Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.119 It concluded that the question of
the constitutional authority of the Board of Higher Education, in contrast to
the constitutional authority of the legislature, was properly before the court
and ready to be decided.120 However, because the necessary number of
Justices required to decide the merits was lacking, the court denied the
application of the State Board of Higher Education.121
The North Dakota Attorney General, as representative of the Board of
Higher Education (Board), petitioned the court to exercise its original
jurisdiction and prevent Secretary of State Al Jaeger from placing on the
June 2012 primary election ballot a referendum measure to reject 2011
North Dakota Sessions Laws chapter 580 (Senate Bill 2370).122 The
submission of the referendum reinstated North Dakota Century Code
section 15-10-46, which requires UND to use the Fighting Sioux nickname
and logo.123 The Board asked the court to declare section 15-10-46
unconstitutionally infringes on the Board’s authority for the control and
administration of UND.124
Although a majority of the court was willing to exercise its
discretionary original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional
issue surrounding the Board’s authority over UND, two members of the
court disagreed, preventing the four votes necessary under North Dakota
Constitution article VI, section 4 to declare a legislative enactment
unconstitutional.125 Because there were not enough members of the court
willing to decide the constitutional issue at the time, the court declined to

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

2012 ND 64, 815 N.W.2d 215.
Jaeger, ¶ 1, 815 N.W.2d at 16.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2, 815 N.W.2d at 216-17.
Id. ¶ 2, 815 N.W.2d at 217.
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enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum measure on the
June 2012 primary election ballot.126
The court then went on to discuss the history of the UND nickname
issue.127 In Davidson v. State, the court found a settlement agreement
between the Board and UND against the NCAA permitted the Board to end
UND’s use of the “Fighting Sioux” nickname and logo.128 In response,
during the 2011 regular legislative session, the legislature enacted section
15-10-56, requiring UND to continue its use of the “Fighting Sioux.”129
During the 2011 special legislative session, the legislature repealed section
15-10-56 through Senate Bill 2370, which likewise provided that neither the
Board, nor UND could adopt a nickname or logo before 2015.130
The Secretary of State subsequently approved a referendum petition for
circulation to North Dakota voters which would repeal Senate Bill 2370.131
After acquiring a sufficient number of signatures, the Sponsoring
Committee placed the referendum on the 2012 primary election ballot and
submitted it to the Secretary of State.132 This effectively reinstated section
15-10-56, requiring UND to use the Fighting Sioux nickname and logo for
its intercollegiate teams.133
On February 17, 2012, the Attorney General, on behalf of the Board,
petitioned the North Dakota Supreme Court to exercise its original
jurisdiction and enjoin the Secretary of State from placing the referendum
on the June 2012 primary election ballot.134 The court, on its own motion,
added the Sponsoring Committee for the referendum petition as a party to
the proceeding, and subsequently granted the Assembly’s motion to
intervene.135
The Board argued that the Court has mandatory original jurisdiction
under North Dakota Constitution article III, sections 6 and 7 to review
decisions by the Secretary of State regarding initiative and referendum
petitions.136 The Board also argued that if the court lacked mandatory
original jurisdiction to review referendum decisions by the Secretary of

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 3-7, 815 N.W.2d at 217-18
Id. ¶ 3, 815 N.W.2d at 217.
Id. ¶ 4 (citing Davidson v. State, 2010 ND 68, ¶¶ 2-7, 781 N.W.2d 73-74).
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. at 217-18.
Id.
Id. ¶ 7, 815 N.W.2d at 218.
Id.
Id. ¶ 8.
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State, it should exercise its discretionary original jurisdiction under North
Dakota Constitution article VI, section 2.137
The Secretary of State, the Sponsoring Committee, and the Legislative
Assembly, on the other hand, responded that the Secretary of State has a
limited ministerial role when reviewing petitions for a referred measure.138
They asserted that if the petitions are proper in form and contain the
requisite number of valid signatures, the Secretary of State must place the
measure on the ballot without considering the substance or determining the
constitutionality of the referred measure.139 The Sponsoring Committee
and the Legislative Assembly argued that constitutionality of North Dakota
Century Code section 15-10-46 is not ripe for review before the voters have
an opportunity to vote on the referendum measure.140 The Legislative
Assembly also argued that the specific language in North Dakota
Constitution article III, sections 6 and 7 controls the general language for
the Court’s discretionary original jurisdiction in North Dakota Constitution
article VI, section 2.141
Under the mandatory self-executing provisions of North Dakota
Constitution article III, the Secretary of State’s responsibilities are limited
to the form and the sufficiency of the petition.142 The court found that the
Secretary of State’s responsibilities under those provisions do not include
the authority to review the constitutionality of the measure.143
The majority also decided that because it has discretionary authority to
exercise original jurisdiction to issue remedial writs, it must decide whether
it had original jurisdiction in this case.144 Although the court is required by
the constitution to review decisions by the Secretary of State regarding the
form and sufficiency for placement of referendum measures on the ballot,
those mandatory provisions did not apply to this case because the Board
never asserted that the Secretary improperly performed his ministerial
functions.145 Nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, the
majority concluded it had original jurisdiction in the case.146
The court then analyzed a number of cases, concluding discretionary
original jurisdiction for issues involving referendum petitions is not
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 10.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11, 815 N.W.2d at 218-19.
Id. ¶ 13, 815 N.W.2d at 219.
Id.
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precluded by the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction to review the Secretary of
State’s decisions under North Dakota Constitution article III.147
The Attorney General’s petition rose fundamental questions involving
the prerogatives of the State and the sovereign rights of its people, which
the Court ruled are statewide interests and go to core issues involving the
limits of governmental authority in the context of the Board’s authority to
decide the name and logo for UND’s intercollegiate athletic teams.148 The
majority essentially found that the Attorney General, on behalf of the
Board, seeks a declaration on the constitutionality of North Dakota Century
Code section 15-10-46 and the posture of the issues satisfy the requirements
for the court to exercise its original jurisdiction in the case.149 Nevertheless,
although a majority of the court was willing to exercise its discretionary
original jurisdiction and consider the underlying constitutional issue about
the Board’s authority over UND, two members concluded this was not an
appropriate case for the court to exercise its discretionary original
jurisdiction.150 As a result, the court concluded there were not enough
members willing to decide the constitutional issue at that time.151

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. ¶ 15-16, 815 N.W.2d at 220.
Id. ¶ 17, 815 N.W.2d at 221.
Id.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
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CRIMINAL LAW – RIGHT OF ACCUSED TO CONFRONT
WITNESSES – USE OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
State of North Dakota, ex rel. Nathan Kirke Madden v. The Honorable
Joshua B. Rustad
In State ex rel. Madden v. Rustad,152 James Christianson sought to have
the State produce the Director of the State Crime Laboratory as a witness at
trial in his prosecution for driving while intoxicated.153 The State opposed
his objection, and the district court issued an order requiring the Director to
testify, or the state could not introduce the lab report showing
Christianson’s blood-alcohol content at the time of arrest.154 The State filed
a petition for a supervisory writ with the North Dakota Supreme Court,
asking the court to reverse the district court’s pretrial order.155 The North
Dakota Supreme Court issued the supervisory writ.156
Christianson was arrested for suspicion of DUI and agreed to a blood
draw taken at a Williston hospital.157 The State notified Christianson of its
intent to introduce the laboratory report analyzing the blood sample under
North Dakota Rule of Evidence 707.158 Under Rule 707(b), Christianson
objected to the introduction of the report and identified various witnesses
requested to testify at trial, including the lab analyst and the Director.159
The district court ruled the analytic report was inadmissible without the
testimony of the Director because the plain language of Rule 707(b) says
the State must produce the person requested by the defendant.160

152. 2012 ND 242, 823 N.W.2d 767.
153. Rustad, ¶ 2, 823 N.W.2d at 768.
154. Id. ¶ 3, 823 N.W.2d at 768-69.
155. Id. ¶ 1, 823 N.W.2d at 768.
156. Id.
157. Id. ¶ 2.
158. Id. The notice requirement provides:
If the prosecution intends to introduce an analytical . . . in a criminal trial, it must
notify the defendant or the defendant's attorney in writing of its intent to introduce the
report and must also serve a copy of the report on the defendant or the defendant's
attorney at least 30 days before the trial.
N.D. R. EVID. 707(a).
159. Rustad, ¶ 2.
160. Id. ¶ 3, 823 N.W.2d at 768-69. The objection provision states:
At least 14 days before the trial, the defendant may object in writing to the
introduction of the report and identify the name or job title of the witness to be
produced to testify about the report at trial. If objection is made, the prosecutor must
produce the person requested. If the witness is not available to testify, the court must
grant a continuance.
N.D. R. EVID. 707(b).
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The State argued first that this case was appropriate for the issuance of
a writ because the State lacks another adequate remedy.161 The North
Dakota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, as amicus curiae, argued
the State could have produced the Director, or deposed her and presented
the deposition at trial, and therefore, the State was so harmed as to require
the issuance of a supervisory writ.162 The North Dakota Supreme Court
concluded that this in an extraordinary case, because there very limited
alternatives for the State to obtain review in a criminal case.163 Either the
defendant would be acquitted, and under North Dakota Century Code
section 29-28-07, the State could not appeal,164 or if the defendant were
convicted, he or she would not raise an issue on appeal about a pretrial
order that was beneficial to the defendant, and the State would be prevented
from raising that issue.165 Because there was no other remedy available, the
North Dakota Supreme Court found this to be an appropriate case to
exercise its supervisory powers.166
On the merits, the State argued the witness to be produced by the state
under Rule 707(b) must only be a person making a testimonial statement. 167
The State’s position was that the Director had not part in the actual conduct
of the chemical analysis in Christianson’s case and should not have to
testify.168 Under the United States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Crawford
v. Washington, a “witness” whom the State is required to produce at trial
under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause is a person who makes a
solemn declaration of some fact.169 The North Dakota Supreme Court held
Rule 707 only covers those witnesses who are considered to have given
testimonial statements.170 The Director, the court held, made no testimonial
statements in this case.171 The Director’s only statement was that the lab
analyst was a “designee” of the Director, and thus qualified to conduct the
laboratory analysis.172 There was nothing that the Director would have
been examined about at trial that would have been useful to prove or
disprove the statements made in the chemical analysis report of
161. Rustad, ¶ 6.
162. Id. ¶ 7.
163. Id. ¶ 6.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 8.
168. Id. at 769-70.
169. Id. ¶ 10, 823 N.W.2d at 770.
170. Id. ¶¶ 14-15, 823 N.W.2d at 772-73 (citing State ex rel. Roseland v. Herauf, 2012 ND
151, 819 N.W.2d 546); State v. Lutz, 2012 ND 256, 820 N.W.2d 111.
171. Id. ¶ 17, 823 N.W.2d at 773.
172. Id.
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Christianson’s blood sample.173 Accordingly, the North Dakota Supreme
Court issued a supervisory writ, and directed the district court to vacate its
pretrial order.174

173. Id.
174. Id. ¶ 20.
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EMINENT DOMAIN – DELEGATION OF POWER – FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS AND CORPORATIONS
SUBORDINATE THERETO
Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Thomas Anderson
In Minnkota Power Cooperative v. Anderson,175 several landowners in
Wells and Sheridan Counties appealed a district court judgment which
permitted Minnkota Power Cooperative, Inc. to enter their properties for
inspection and surveying.176 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that Minnkota, despite being a foreign corporation, was properly entitled to
exercise the power of eminent domain under North Dakota public utility
statutes, and could therefore request the inspections.177
Minnkota is an electricity generating cooperative organized under
Minnesota law, but authorized as a foreign cooperative to do business in
North Dakota.178 As part of its operations, Minnkota was planning on
building a 250 mile transmission line from Center, North Dakota to Grand
Forks, North Dakota.179 Minnkota first asked landowners along the
proposed route for permission to conduct surveys and testing, and while
many landowners consented, several declined.180 In response, Minnkota
petitioned the district courts of Wells and Sheridan Counties to gain access
by court order.181 The landowners objected, and moved to dismiss the
petitions.182 Both the district courts in Wells and Sheridan Counties granted
Minnkota’s petition.183
On appeal, the landowners argued foreign cooperatives are not entitled
to exercise eminent domain because the chapter of the North Dakota
Century Code which contains the eminent domain power only applies to
North Dakota cooperatives.184 They argued that since electric cooperatives
are governed by North Dakota Century Code chapter 10-13 and Minnkota is
a foreign cooperative operating under chapter 10-15, Minnkota cannot have
the power of eminent domain granted under chapter 10-13.185
175. 2012 ND 105, 817 N.W.2d 325.
176. Minnkota, ¶ 1, 817 N.W.2d at 326.
177. Id. ¶ 16, 817 N.W.2d at 331.
178. Id. ¶ 2, 817 N.W.2d at 327.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Both district courts held the authorization of Minnkota as a foreign
cooperative included the power of eminent domain, but the Wells County court held the issuance
of a certificate of site compatibility by the North Dakota Public Service Commission also
authorized Minnkota to use eminent domain for this project. Id.
184. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 12, 817 N.W.2d at 328-31.
185. Id.
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First, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted the arguments advanced
by the landowners required statutory interpretation, which the court
considers de novo.186 The court highlighted North Dakota Century Code
section 10-15-52, which grants foreign cooperatives “‘all rights,
exemptions, and privileges of a cooperative organized for the same
purposes under the laws of this state.’”187 Since the power of eminent
domain is a right given to domestic electric cooperatives, Minnkota would
be entitled to that right as well.188
Second, the North Dakota Supreme Court explored the ambiguous
terms of North Dakota Century Code section 10-15-60.189 That section
provides in part
All foreign and domestic cooperatives are governed by the
provisions of this chapter except that they shall not apply to
cooperatives governed by . . . chapter[] . . . 10-13, . . . except when
the laws governing such associations clearly adopt or refer to any
provisions of this chapter or refer to provisions of the general law
governing cooperatives.190
The landowners argued that Minnkota is a foreign cooperative operating
under chapter 10-15, and thus cannot use the eminent domain power under
chapter 10-13.191 They argued that “cooperative” as defined in chapter 1015 precluded the finding that Minnkota could be considered an electric
cooperative under chapter 10-13.192 The North Dakota Supreme Court
disagreed, noting that North Dakota Century Code section 10-13-01 permits
an electric cooperative to be organized under either chapter 10-13, chapter
10-15, or both.193 Looking at the legislative history surrounding the
adoption of section 10-15-60, the court noted the intention of the legislature
was to clear up contradictory organization requirements for cooperatives,
but also to give cooperatives flexibility to determine under which chapter to
organize.194 Because Minnkota is a foreign cooperative permitted to do
business in North Dakota, and an electric cooperative can be organized
under both chapter 10-13 and/or 10-15, Minnkota is granted all powers as if
186. Id. ¶ 6, 817 N.W.2d at 328. The court also noted the grant of a certificate of cite
compatibility by the ND PSC could not confer the power of eminent domain, thus partially
disagreeing with the Wells County District Court. Id.
187. Id. ¶ 8 (quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-52 (2012)).
188. Id. at 329.
189. Id. ¶¶ 9-10.
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-15-60 (2012).
191. Minnkota, ¶ 12, 817 N.W.2d at 330-31.
192. Id.
193. Id. ¶ 13, 817 N.W.2d at 331.
194. Id. ¶ 11, 817 N.W.2d at 330.

2012]

NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW

537

organized under the laws of North Dakota, including the power of eminent
domain under chapter 10-13.195 The court held the use of the definition of
cooperative is not a proper means to limit a foreign cooperative when the
legislature clearly stated a foreign cooperative, if properly registered in
North Dakota, has all the powers of a domestic cooperative under state law,
not just the particular chapter on general cooperative law.196 Accordingly,
the North Dakota Supreme Court found Minnkota was entitled to use
eminent domain and could properly petition for survey access to the
landowner’s property in furtherance of that power.197

195. Id. ¶ 14, 817 N.W.2d at 331.
196. Id.
197. Id. ¶ 16.
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NUISANCE – DUTY OF CARE FOR ADJOINING PROPERTY
OWNERS – RIGHT TO RECOVER FOR DAMAGES CAUSE BY
ENCROACHING TREES
Richard Herring of Herring Chiropractic Clinic v. Lisbon Partners
Credit Fund, Ltd. Partnership and Five Star Services
In Herring v. Lisbon Partners,198 Herring appealed a district court
summary judgment dismissing his claim against Lisbon Partners and Five
Star Services for nuisance, negligence, and civil trespass.199 The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court’s decision, holding that it
had erred in finding that Lisbon Partners and Five Star owed no duty to
Herring to prevent damage caused by encroachment of branches from their
tree onto Herring’s property.200
Herring owns a commercial building in Lisbon which houses his
chiropractic business.201 The adjoining property is owned by Lisbon
Partners and managed by Five Star.202 Branches from a large tree on the
Lisbon property overhung onto Herring’s property and brushed against his
building.203 For many years, Herring trimmed back the encroaching
branches and cleaned out his downspouts and gutters, which were clogged
by leaves, twigs and debris from the branches. 204 Herring claimed that the
encroaching branches had caused damage to his building by creating water
and ice dams to build up on his roof, which eventually led to more
significant damage.205 After Lisbon and Five Star denied responsibility for
the damages, Herring sued them for the cost of repairs to his building,
claiming they had committed civil trespass and negligence, and had
maintained a nuisance by breaching their duty to maintain and trim the tree
so that it did not cause damage to his property.206 The district court
dismissed Herrings claims, concluding that Lisbon Partners and Fives Star
had no duty to trim or maintain the tree, but that Herring could trim the
branches back at his own expense.207
The North Dakota Supreme Court found Herring’s appeal valid
because, although an appeal from an order granting summary judgment is

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

2012 ND 226, 823 N.W.2d 493.
Herring, ¶ 1, 823 N.W.2d at 495.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id.
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not appealable, the appeal is treated as an appeal from a judgment because a
consistent judgment was entered in this case.208
The first part of the court’s analysis involved a discussion of the four
different approaches used by courts around the country regarding a
landowner’s duty to maintain and trim trees on his land, which encroach
and cause damage to the property of adjoining landowners.209 Under the
“Massachusetts rule,” a landowner has no liability to neighboring
landowners for damages caused by encroachment.210 The neighboring
landowner’s remedy is limited to self-help.211 Under the “Hawaii rule,” the
owner of a tree may be held liable when encroaching branches or roots
cause harm, or create imminent danger of causing harm, beyond merely
casting shade or dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.212 However, a
landowner may always cut away, only to his property line above or below
the surface of the ground, any part of the adjoining owner’s trees or other
plant life.213 The “Restatement rule,” from the Second Restatement of
Torts, finds that an artificially planted or maintained tree may be a nuisance
and impose liability on the landowner.214 However, there is no liability for
a naturally growing tree which encroaches on neighboring land.215 Lastly,
the “Virginia rule,” makes a distinction between noxious and non-noxious
trees.216 Under this rule, damages are available for encroachment by a
damage-causing noxious tree, but damage caused by encroachment of a
non-noxious tree is limited to self-help.217
After analyzing the various rules, the court surmised that under any of
the rules, regardless of the circumstances, the adjoining landowner would
have the right to self-help, allowing him to cut back the intruding branches
and roots to his property line at his own expense.218
The court then disagreed with the district courts analysis, finding that
its decision, as well as section 47-01-12, conflict with the more specific
section 47-01-17 of the North Dakota Century Code.219 Because section
47-01-17 contains a particular provision with respect to tree ownership, that
208. Id. ¶ 5, 823 N.W.2d at 496.
209. Id. ¶¶ 8-12.
210. Id. ¶ 9, 823 N.W.2d at 496-97 (citing Michalson v. Nutting, 175 N.E. 490, 490-91
(Mass. 1931)).
211. Id. at 497.
212. Id. ¶ 10 (citing Whitesell v. Houlton, 632 P.2d 1077, 1078 (Haw. 1981)).
213. Id.
214. Id. ¶ 11 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 839-40 (1979)).
215. Id.
216. Id. ¶ 12 (citing Smith v. Holt, 5 S.E.2d 492, 495 (Va. 1939)).
217. Id. at 497-98.
218. Id. ¶ 13, 823 N.W.2d at 498.
219. Id. ¶¶ 15-19, 823 N.W.2d at 498-99.
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section would take precedence over the conflicting portion of 47-01-12, and
requires vesture of ownership of the entire tree in that individual who owns
the trunk of the tree.220 The Supreme Court then concluded that the
“Hawaii rule,” which is expressly based on the concept that the owner of
the trunk of the tree owns the entire tree, more fully gives effect to both
statutory provisions.221 The court likewise found that, in addition to
comporting most closely with North Dakota statutory law, the Hawaii
approach is the most fair and well-reasoned of the four approaches because
it recognizes the tree owner’s ownership and responsibility for the entire
tree, while also protecting the neighboring landowner’s right to everything
above and below the surface of his land.222 Furthermore, the other
approaches have either been widely criticized, or been adopted in very few
jurisdictions.223
Upon adopting the Hawaii rule, the court reversed the district court and
held that the owners of the encroaching tree were not liable for any
damages caused by the tree dropping leaves, flowers, or fruit.224 However,
remanded the issue whether there was a material factual dispute regarding
whether damages have resulted from the tree’s branches physically scraping
Herring’s building.225 If Herring is able to present evidence establishing
damages caused by the tree’s branches physically contacting the building,
Lisbon Partners and Five Star would be liable for such damages under the
Hawaii rule.226
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Id. ¶ 16, 823 N.W.2d at 499.
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Id. ¶ 18.
Id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 823 N.W.2d at 499-500.
Id. ¶ 26, 823 N.W.2d at 502.
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